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Preferential Treatment of Charities
Under the Unemployment Insurance
Laws
The contributions collected from employers under State unemploy-
ment compensation laws are not in the nature of a general tax for
general revenue purposes . . . . [T]his is a specific payroll levy for a
specific purpose. . . . If you are going to have a specific premium
for this specific purpose, then it is only logical, fair and equitable
that each type of enterprise pretty much carry its own unemploy-
ment costs.1
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (the "Act") 2 governs an unem-
ployment insurance program for employees of both nonprofit and for-
profit organizations. Federal and state payroll taxes, levied on employers
and based on an employer's prior unemployment record,3 fund the unem-
ployment insurance program and pay for unemployment compensation
benefits. Despite the program's explicit premise that the costs of unem-
ployment are an ordinary and necessary cost of doing business that should
be financed by employers,4 and the extension of coverage to nonprofit em-
1. Address by Paul A. Raushenbush, Director, Unemployment Compensation Dep't, Industrial
Comm'n of Wisconsin (Oct. 21, 1941), reprinted in P. RAUSHENBUSH & E. RAUSHENBUSH, OUR
"U.C." STORY 1930-1967, at 281, 292-93 (1979).
2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982).
3. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
4. "The basic justification for using a payroll levy at all, to finance unemployment compensation,
is that irregular employment and lay-offs and unemployment are connected with business operations,
and that benefit costs should accordingly be treated and assessed as business costs." Raushenbush,
supra note 1, at 293. In discussing his approval of the payroll tax on employers, President Franklin
Roosevelt stated that "the costs of seasonal and intermittent unemployment . . . [are] a foreseeable
loss, the major cost of which ought to be computed and borne like every other cost of a business."
Letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to a Congressman (March 23, 1934), in 3 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosEvELT 161, 161 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
ROOSEVELT PAPERS]; see also Rector, The Frailty of the "Fallacy" of Experience Rating, 2 LAB.
L.J. 338, 346 (1951) ("Certainly the cost of industrial unemployment is a production cost . . ").
Despite this understanding of the purpose and rationale for unemployment taxes, Congress has




ployees,5 federal law entitles section 501(c)(3) employers' to preferential
treatment, effectively subsidizing one of their ordinary business costs.7
Given the expansion of the nonprofit sector,' the increasing number of
nonprofit organizations that compete with profit-motivated organizations, 9
5. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104, 84 Stat. 695, 697-99
(amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 3303(e), (f), 3304(a)(6), 3309).
6. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts only certain
nonprofit organizations from the federal income tax. Those exempt under § 501(c)(3) are commonly
called charities. Section 501(c)(3) defines these charities as:
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational pur-
poses, or to foster national or international sports competition (but only if no part of its activi-
ties involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,. . . and which does not participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
For a discussion of possible reasons for this exemption, see infra Part II. Although the income of
these organizations is generally tax-exempt, it may be subject to tax under the Unrelated Business
Income Tax. See infra note 45.
7. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from the federal unemployment tax, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3306(c)(8). In addition, because these employers may choose between two methods of paying for
their employees' unemployment insurance coverage, either prepayment of insurance taxes or reim-
bursement, see 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a)(2), they are eligible for deferred payment schedules for the state
tax, see infra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
8. Charitable organizations constitute a rapidly growing and increasingly important sector of the
economy. Between 1968 and 1979, the number of § 501(c)(3) organizations more than doubled, in-
creasing from 137,500 to 293,000. Weisbrod, Assets and Employment in the Nonprofit Sector, 10
PUB. FIN. Q. 403, 412-13 (1982). Although statistics on employment in the nonprofit sector are not
precise, and estimates vary, all analysts agree that the nonprofit sector has become an important
segment of the total labor force. See Rudney, A Quantitative Profile of the Nonprofit Sector 3-4,
11-17 (Working Paper No. 40, Program on Non-profit Organizations, Institution for Social and
Policy Studies, Yale University (November 1981)); Rudney & Weitzman, Significance of Employ-
ment and Earnings in the Philanthropic Sector, 1972-1982, at 7-21 (Working Paper No. 77, Pro-
gram on Non-profit Organizations, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University (Novem-
ber 1983)); Sumariwalla, Preliminary Observations on Scope, Size, and Classification of the Sector,
in INDEPENDENT SECTOR, WORKING PAPERS FOR SPRING RESEARCH FORUM: SINCE THE FILER
COMMISSION 181, 197-200 (1983). A 1974 estimate attributed 5% of the nation's employment to the
nonprofit sector. D. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? 9 (1983). Using a slightly different
methodology, a 1973 estimate found that nonprofit organizations accounted for 8% of national em-
ployment. Id. In 1977, nonprofit organizations accounted for V3 of the employment in the rapidly
growing services sector of the nation's economy, employing five times as many people as the automo-
bile industry. L. SALAMON & A. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUIGET AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
12 (1982). In 1980, nonprofit organizations employed an estimated 5.6 million people. Sumariwalla,
supra, at 198.
9. The nonprofit sector has expanded in size and changed in character. Hansmann, The Ration-
ale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54,
57-58 & nn.16 & 17 [hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting]. Competition be-
tween similar for-profit and nonprofit entities has greatly increased, particularly in industries such as
hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. See id.; H. Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and
Other Factors on Competition Between Nonprofit and For-profit Enterprise 1-2, 7-8 (Working Pa-
per No. 65, Program on Non-profit Organizations, Institution for Social and Policy Research, Yale
University (December 1982)) [hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Effect on Competition]. Often there is
little or no difference between the for-profit and nonprofit competitors. See Hansmann, Rationale for
Exempting, supra, at 54; Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 862-68
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Role]; see also Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospi-
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and the growing budget deficit,1" preferential treatment of charitable orga-
nizations under the unemployment insurance program must be reevalu-
ated.11 A remnant of the traditional special treatment of charities,12 this
preferential treatment is based on faulty premises, results in for-profit
firms' subsidizing the labor costs of charities, and creates unfair and unde-
sirable competitive advantages for charities. Accordingly, Congress should
eliminate this preferential treatment of charitable organizations under the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
A basic premise of the unemployment insurance program is that unem-
ployment insurance is a regular cost of doing business that employers
should finance.'" Congress created the unemployment insurance program
in the 1930's as an insurance, not as an income transfer, program.14 It
tal Industry?, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1416, 1448-71 (1980) (arguing that many traditional rationales for
preferential treatment of nonprofit hospitals inadequate for distinguishing between nonprofit and
profit-motivated institutions).
10. Although the unemployment insurance program was designed to be self-financing, the statute
contains provisions to ensure that unemployed workers receive benefits even if their state's unemploy-
ment fund becomes insolvent. State funds can borrow, interest free, from the federal unemployment
account. If this account is depleted, advances from general Treasury revenues, in effect interest-free
loans, provide financing for the benefits owed. P. MACKIN, BENEFIT FINANCING IN UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: A PROBLEM OF BALANCING RESPONSIBILIrIEs 122-24 (1978). In 1975, the federal un-
employment account was depleted, bringing into operation the provision for Treasury advances.
Funds in the federal extended unemployment compensation account, see infra note 17, were also
exhausted, necessitating additional borrowing from Treasury revenues. Id. at 60-61. As of 1978, the
Treasury had advanced $8.7 billion to the extended unemployment compensation account and $4.8
billion to the federal unemployment account. Id. at 124 n.7.
11. A recent U.S. government audit report recommended that Congress revise this preferential
treatment. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DFP'T OF LABOR, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED
IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RFIMBURSABLE EMPLOYER SYSTEM (1984) [hereinafter cited
as 1984 AUDIT REPORT]. The report, however, addressed only some of the practical effects of the
unemployment tax exemption, and failed to question the basic rationales underlying the preferential
treatment. "The Office of Inspector General . . . made this review to determine the effect the reim-
bursable employer system has on the interest earnings of the Unemployment Trust Fund, and to
determine the effect of reimbursable employers' exemption from paying the [federal unemployment]
tax." Id. at 1.
12. See, e.g., G. FRIEDMAN, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: WHAT AND WHY? 41 (U.S. Soc.
Security Bd. Publication No. 14, 1937): "Employees of religious, charitable, and educational institu-
tions all could readily come within the compass of an unemployment compensation system but were
exempted from the Federal tax on the ground that by established precedent organizations of these
kinds are generally exempted from taxes."
13. See supra note 4.
14. President Franklin Roosevelt, the principal champion of the unemployment insurance pro-
gram, stated, "We must not allow . . . [unemployment] insurance to become a dole through the
mingling of insurance and relief. It is not charity." F. ROOSEVELT, Address to the Advisory Council
of the Committee on Economic Security (Nov. 14, 1934), in 3 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 4, at
452, 453. President Roosevelt had already strongly stated his views on unemployment insurance when
he was governor of New York:
[Unemployment] relief should not, of course, take the shape of a dole in any respect. The dole
method of relief for unemployment is not only repugnant to all sound principles of social
economics, but is contrary to every principle of American citizenship and of sound government.
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was to be self-supporting, and employees were to feel that they had
earned their unemployment compensation benefits.15
A. Provisions Governing Non-Charitable Employers
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act created a federal unemployment
insurance program, imposing a federal payroll tax on employers.16 Reve-
nue from this tax finances the administrative costs of the unemployment
insurance program and some employee benefits. 17
American labor seeks no charity, but only a chance to work for its living. The relief which the
workers of the State should be able to anticipate . . . should be one of insurance ....
F. ROOSEVELT, A Recommendation for a Commission to Investigate Unemployment Insurance
(March 25, 1931), in 1 ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 4, at 455, 456; see also E. BURNS, SOCIAL
SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 209 (1956) (proposals for unemployment insurance programs stressed
they were not "doles," as British program appeared to be); Malisoff, The Import of Theory in Unem-
ployment Compensation, 55 POL. SCI. Q. 249, 249 (1940) (unemployment insurance program
designed to minimize its resemblance to European systems, which disbursed "doles").
15. The insurance mechanism was seen as an appropriate response to the emotional, as well as
economic, strains resulting from unemployment:
The loss of a job brings discouragement and privation to the individual worker and his family.
If an insurance or reserve fund has been accumulated, even a small payment from it at such a
critical time will tide over the worker and keep up his morale and purchasing power.
Letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to a Congressman, supra note 4, at 161.
A pamphlet issued to explain the new program spoke of the "necessity for a more systematic
method of alleviating the suffering caused by unemployment." BUREAU Or UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION, U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY BD., CIRCULAR No. 2, WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 2 (1937) [hereinafter cited as WHAT You SHOULD KNOW]. Main-
taining the unemployed on "relief" was rejected as "humiliating" and "demoralizing to the recipient
and wasteful to the Nation." Id. Stern language emphasized that "[t]he term 'dole' is not applicable to
payments of regular unemployment compensation benefits which are payable as a right on the basis of
previous payments on behalf of the worker." Id. at 5; see also J. BECKER, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE FINANCING 13, 138 (1981) (self-supporting nature of program and fact that benefits were
"earned" were essential to program).
16. Under the Act, every employer must pay an annual federal tax equal to 6.2% of wages paid
for employment covered by the Act. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, tit. II, § 271(c)(1), (d)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 555 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 3301).
The statute defines an employer to be any person who paid wages of $1,500 or more during the
present or preceding calendar year, or who employed at least one individual for some portion of at
least one day in each of twenty different calendar weeks during the present or preceding calendar
years. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1) (1982). Separate provisions define employers in the case of agricultural
labor, id. § 3306(a)(2), and domestic service, id. § 3306(a)(3). Among the employment excluded
from the federal tax is "service performed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or
other organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt from income tax under section
501(a)." Id. § 3306(c)(8).
17. In addition to covering the program's administrative costs, the federal tax finances a loan
fund, the federal unemployment account. If a state's unemployment account does not contain sufficient
funds to cover the state's unemployment compensation obligations, the state's account can borrow,
interest free, from the federal unemployment account.
In states with very high unemployment levels, unemployed workers can receive up to 13 additional
weeks of "extended benefits," the costs of which are shared by the states and the federal government.
The federal tax also finances half of the "extended benefits" paid to unemployed workers who have
exhausted their 26 weeks of regular state unemployment compensation benefits. Originally provided
only by temporary legislation enacted during prolonged periods of high unemployment, extended ben-
efits became a mandatory and permanent feature of all state unemployment insurance laws in 1970.
Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 524, 84
Stat. 695, reprinted as amended as note following 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1982). Legislation to reduce
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Most employee benefits, however, are financed by state unemployment
insurance payroll taxes.18 Although all covered employers must pay the
federal unemployment tax, only those employees whose state has enacted
a program receive unemployment compensation benefits."9 The Act con-
tains a tax incentive enabling2 ° states to enact programs satisfying the fed-
eral guidelines:2" It credits an employer's state unemployment taxes to-
ward the employer's federal unemployment tax obligation for that year.22
While the federal unemployment tax rate is the same for all employ-
ers,2" the state programs all use an experiential state unemployment tax
rate. An employer's state tax rate varies according to the employer's past
unemployment experience.2 Thus, employers with good employment
federal spending for domestic programs severely limited the availability of extended benefits. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2401, 95 Stat. 357, 874-76 (amending
Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970). In February 1985, the extended
benefits program was active in only two states, West Virginia and Alaska.
18. State unemployment taxes, which are deposited into the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund,
finance all employee benefits except for one-half of the costs of the extended unemployment benefits,
and the loans advanced to state unemployment accounts, see supra note 17.
19. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1982).
20. Fearful of placing employers within the state at a disadvantage relative to employers in other
states, each state was reluctant to enact an unemployment insurance program on its own. Malisoff,
supra note 14, at 249. Prior to the 1935 federal legislation, only Wisconsin had enacted such a
program. W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
69-70, 74 (1966); P. MACKIN, supra note 10, at 8 n.6. Federal action removed the danger of this
competitive disadvantage. E. BURNS, TOWARD SOCIAL SECURITY 54-55 (1936).
21. The requirements for state unemployment insurance laws are set forth in 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 3304(a)(1)-(18) (West Supp. 1984).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). An employer's total credits toward the federal unemployment tax
obligation may not exceed 90% of the employer's federal unemployment tax obligation. Id.
§ 3302(c)(1).
23. The federal unemployment tax rate is set at 6.2% for all employers covered by the Act. Tax
Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. II, § 271(c)(1), (d)(2), 96 Stat.
324, 555 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 3301). An employer's federal tax payments vary only according to
the amount of the state tax credited toward the federal unemployment insurance tax obligation.
24. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act both authorizes and places certain restrictions on state
implementation of these experience rating systems. An employer's state unemployment tax rate may
be reduced only on the basis of the employer's prior employment experience. 26 U.S.C. § 3303(a)
(1982). Before 1970, an employer could benefit from experience rating provisions only after paying
the full tax rate for at least one year. In 1970 Congress amended the statute, permitting states to grant
reduced "experience" ratings (but not less than one percent) to new or newly covered employers.
Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 122(a), 84 Stat. 695, 702
(amending 26 U.S.C. § 3303(a)(3) (1954)).
Experience rating serves several important objectives. First, the threat of increases in tax rates
provides an incentive for employers to stabilize employment. Second, experience rating equitably allo-
cates unemployment compensation costs among employers: Those responsible for the payment of more
unemployment benefits must pay a higher tax. Third, experience rating attempts to ensure that unem-
ployment reserve funds are neither excessive nor inadequate. Fourth, it encourages employers actively
to "police" the payment of unemployment compensation benefits, ensuring that they are paid only to
those who ought to receive them. J. BECKER, supra note 15, at 66-68, 88-95, 102-05; W. HABER &
M. MURRAY, supra note 20, at 337-46; E. BURNS, supra note 14, at 166; Raushenbush, supra note
1, at 289-97; Rector, supra note 4, at 344-48.
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records pay lower unemployment taxes than do those who terminate
larger numbers of employees.
B. Preferential Treatment of Charities
Since its enactment in 1935, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act has
accorded special treatment to charitable organizations. 26 The statute pres-
ently provides for preferential treatment of any "religious, charitable, edu-
cational, or other organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is ex-
empt from income tax under section 501(a) [of the Internal Revenue
Code]."27
Prior to 1970, charities paid no unemployment taxes, and their employ-
ees received no benefits, unless a state's law provided otherwise.28 In
1970, Congress required the states to extend coverage to the employees of
most charitable organizations.29 Charities, however, do not have to finance
25. The Act prevents the benefits of the state tax experience ratings from being cancelled out by a
comparable increase in the employer's federal unemployment insurance payments. The Act provides
that an employer paying less than the state maximum rate may receive a federal credit equal to the
amount of tax due under the maximum state rate, up to a maximum credit of 5.4% of the employer's
taxable payroll. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. II,
§ 271(c)(2), (3)(A), (B), (d)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 555 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 3302(b)). An employer
may receive this additional credit only if the state tax reduction was based on the employer's experi-
ence rating. 26 U.S.C. § 3303 (1982).
Since each state now has an unemployment compensation program with experience ratings, the
effective federal unemployment insurance tax is .8% of taxable payroll. 1984 AuDrr REPORT, supra
note 11, at 5.
26. Congress has narrowed the exemption in several stages since 1935. One reason originally
given for excluding employees of these organizations from coverage was that the "socially desirable, or
supposedly socially desirable activities" of these organizations "should not be hampered by requiring
them to be financially responsible for insuring their employees against loss of employment." Gellhorn,
The Extension of Coverage of Unemployment Compensation, 23 MINN. L. REv. 173, 174 (1939).
Others suggested that charities were exempted simply to follow tradition. See WHAT You SmouLD
KNOW, supra note 15, at 11; G. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 41; Gellhorn, supra, at 174.
27. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982). The preferential treatment applies both to employment per-
formed in the conduct of the organization's primary, exempt activities, and to employment performed
in the conduct of its unrelated activities. See Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980)
(employment for church school exempted, because school's employees are employed by church); Rev.
Rul. 56-188, 1956-1 C.B. 485 (services performed by exempt organization's employees in the conduct
of its unrelated business were exempted from social security taxes, under statutory language almost
identical to that of 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982)).
28. Although extension of coverage to employees of these organizations was not forbidden, there
was no federal tax credit incentive to encourage states to do so. Only a few states did provide coverage
for these employees. See Murray, Unemployment Insurance: Risks Covered and Their Financing, in
IN AID OF THE UNEMPLOYED 63, 66-67 (J. Becker ed. 1965).
29. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104, 84 Stat. 695, 697-99
(amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 3303(e), (0, 3304(a)(6), 3309). State law coverage of charities is now a
condition of federal approval of the state program. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6) (1982). Without fed-
eral approval of the state program, other employers in the state would be ineligible to receive the
federal tax credit for their state unemployment insurance tax payments.
The 1970 Amendments extended state unemployment insurance protection to an additional three
million workers in the nonprofit sector. See 33 Soc. SECURrrY BuLL., Nov. 1970, at 30. Under
current law, charities employing fewer than four employees still need not be covered. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3309(c) (1982). The other major groups excluded from mandatory state coverage are employees of
1477
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1472, 1985
this coverage through the traditional unemployment tax. They remain ex-
empt from the federal tax,30 and federal law gives them the choice of re-
imbursing the state for any benefits paid to the organization's employees3'
or paying the state unemployment insurance payroll tax, as other employ-
ers are required to do.3 2 Under either method of payment, the employees
of charitable organizations receive the same unemployment compensation
benefits as do employees of for-profit organizations, but at less cost to
their employer.
Preferential treatment under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act cre-
ates several different financial benefits for section 501(c)(3) employers. 33
First, these employers need not pay the federal tax, which covers the ad-
ministrative costs of the program." Second, section 501(c)(3) employers
save significantly on labor costs because their deferred payment sched-
ule-reimbursing the state rather than prepaying-reduces their unem-
ployment insurance costs.35 Furthermore, reimbursement payments are
churches and of state or local governments. 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (1982).
30. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a)(2) (1982) (state unemployment insurance programs must allow
§ 501(c)(3) employers to elect "to pay (in lieu of such contributions) into the State unemployment
fund amounts equal to the amounts of compensation attributable. . . to such service"). State law may
regulate the time at which the option to elect reimbursement must be exercised, may set a minimum
period for such election to be in effect, and "may provide safeguards to ensure that. . . organizations
so electing will make the payments required under such elections." Id. Although over 20 states pro-
vide authority for the state unemployment commissioner to implement such safeguards, only a few
actually have. 1984 AUDTrr REPORT, supra note 11, at 22-23 (noting the lack of safeguards and
urging that security deposits be required by federal law).
32. Charitable employers that choose to pay the unemployment insurance payroll tax are subject
to the same state tax rates, determined by their past employment record, as other employers in that
state. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a) (1982).
33. The total value of the federal exemption of § 501(c)(3) organizations from the unemployment
insurance tax may be over a quarter of a billion dollars. An employer who is eligible to receive the
full 5.4% state payment credit toward the federal unemployment insurance tax obligation will owe a
federal unemployment insurance tax equal to .8% of the first $7,000 of wages paid to each employee,
see supra note 25, or $56 annually for each employee. Section 501(c)(3) organizations presently em-
ploy 5.3 million workers. See H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 219, 233. If all of them earned at least $7,000, the uncollected federal
unemployment insurance tax alone would be worth about $290 million annually.
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982). The recent audit report calculates that $40 million annu-
ally is "a conservative estimate of the total administration costs associated with reimbursable employ-
ers, but borne by contributory employers." 1984 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 11, at 28. This estimate
includes the administrative costs of covering state and local government employees, as well as those of
charitable organizations. The estimate was not adjusted to account for the fact that "reimbursable
benefits probably incur more than an equal share of administration costs" because of the separate
accounting and billing systems required. Id. at 29. The figure also does not include expenses of other
programs financed by the federal unemployment tax. Id. at 28-29.
35. The present value of a future debt obligation decreases as the payment is deferred farther into
the future. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIvERsrry ECONOMIcs 204 (2d ed. 1968).
Charitable organizations save not only because they do not pay in advance, but also because state
repayment requirements are very lenient. 1984 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 11, at 12-16. Extended
billing schedules enable these employers to borrow from the unemployment tax payments of for-profit
employers, resulting in an unfair tax burden on the for-profit employers. Id. at 3. The state's loss of
investment income from "borrowed" funds costs millions of dollars annually, an estimated $37 million
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likely to be less than regular payroll contributions would have been, 6
thus reducing the reimbursing employer's costs even more. Finally, defer-
ring reimbursement until a time when the employer can perhaps least
afford it-when financial straits have led to personnel reduc-
tions 37 -means that in practice many section 501(c)(3) employers may
never pay the costs of unemployment compensation."' The unemployment
insurance costs of a section 501(c)(3) organization that fails to reimburse
the state's fund will be borne by other employers who have paid their
taxes regularly.39
II. THE FAULTY PREMISES FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
Two particular considerations led Congress to continue preferential
treatment of section 501(c)(3) organizations, when, in 1970, it extended
unemployment insurance coverage to their employees. First, Congress did
not want to change these organizations' tax exempt status. 40 Second, Con-
gress expressed a desire to avoid having nonprofit organizations fund un-
employment costs attributable to profit-motivated employers.4 1 Neither of
in 1982. Id. at 1, 3, 11-12; see also id. at 21 ("Until reimbursable employers are under an advance
payment system, an already insufficient Unemployment Trust Fund will continue to lose millions of
dollars of interest earnings annually due to contributory employers' tax dollars being used to finance
reimbursable benefits.").
36. Because of an increased experiential tax rate, an employer paying the state payroll tax will
often pay considerably more than what the former employee received in benefits. See Payroll Tax
Savings, lB UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1 24,031 (Aug. 22, 1973) (example illustrating what benefit
charges can cost in taxes).
37. Prepayment of unemployment insurance costs, ensuring that an employer paid when he could
best afford it, was one of the benefits of the program as originally designed. Such a program would
tend to alleviate the pressure to raise funds during times of depression when money was most scarce.
See G. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 8. As the program's advocates noted, "[ilt is practical sense to
build a system which will gather the funds in good times and disburse them in bad times. This simple
theory underlies all formal proposals for unemployment insurance . . . ." King, Unemployment
Reserves and Insurance, 23 AM. LAB. LEGis. REV. 170, 170 (1933), quoted in G. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 12, at 1.
38. An employer who dismissed an employee because the organization lacked funds or closed
down might well find it difficult to reimburse the state's unemployment compensation funds promptly,
completely, or even at all. Those who opposed the reimbursement program claimed that the difficul-
ties of reimbursement posed a significant risk in the case of charitable organizations. They argued that
"most unemployment in nonprofit organizations results from budget shortages or closing of institu-
tions." Murray, supra note 28, at 67. Thus, creation of a reimbursement program option was partic-
ularly inappropriate for charitable organizations.
39. The 1984 Audit Report recommends changing the reimbursement option to an advance pay-
ment option, billing § 501(c)(3) employers for the "average monthly or quarterly benefit charges
based on the employer's most current benefit payment history," charging interest if the employer's
payments are consistently lower than the unemployment costs attributed to that employer. 1984 Au-
DrT REPORT, supra note 11, at 17-18 (emphasis in original). Responding only to the practical
problems of financing, this solution does not question the validity of different treatment of charities.
40. S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3606, 3618.
41. Id. Concern that charitable organizations not be required to accumulate unnecessary reserves
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these considerations, however, justifies the preferential treatment accorded
to charities under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
A. Maintaining the Charities' Tax Exempt Status
Federal income tax principles and exemptions neither dictate nor sup-
port the preferential treatment of section 501(c)(3) organizations under
the unemployment insurance program.
1. The Analogy to the Legitimacy of the Income Tax Exemption
Professors Bittker and Rahdert argue that the exemption of charities
from income taxation results from a proper application of generally ac-
cepted principles of income taxation.42 In their view, income tax liability
cannot be assessed for charitable organizations because one can determine
neither the charity's taxable income 3 nor an appropriate tax rate for
charities."' Nothing in this logic of exempting section 501(c)(3) organiza-
during their first few years of coverage, before experience rating would take account of their low
unemployment rates, may have influenced the decision to allow the reimbursement option. See Mur-
ray, supra note 28, at 67 (discussing reimbursement proposals). The same amendments that extended
coverage to employees of § 501(c)(3) organizations, however, also permitted states to grant reduced
"experience" ratings to new employers. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
373, § 122(a), 84 Stat. 695, 702 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 3303(a)(3)). The goal of preventing unnec-
essary build-up of reserves could thus have been accomplished without the unemployment tax
exemptions.
42. Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxa-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357-58 (1976): "The exemption of nonprofit organizations from federal
income taxation is neither a special privilege nor a hidden subsidy. Rather, it reflects the application
of established principles of income taxation to organizations which . . . do not seek profit."
43. Bittker and Rahdert view the computation of a charity's taxable income as "a conceptually
difficult, if not self-contradictory task." Id. at 307. First, it is unclear whether donations should be
excluded from income under I.R.C. § 102 (1982). Id. at 308. Second, even if gross income could be
calculated, they argue that current tax rules for determining taxable income are inappropriate for
charities. Id. at 309-14. For example, the concept of deducting "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses, I.R.C. § 162 (1982), presumes a profit motive, which is obviously not present for charitable
organizations. Id. at 309-12. Finally, Bittker and Rahdert suggest that charities may be thought of as
conduits for gifts from donors to beneficiaries. As a conduit, the charity itself would have no income
for tax purposes. Id. at 312-13. But see infra note 51 and accompanying text (argument that income
tax for charities is possible).
44. An appropriate tax rate would be determined in accordance with either the "benefit" or the
"ability to pay" theories of taxation. See, e.g., R. MUSORAVE & P. MUSCRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 227-28 (4th ed. 1984) (summarizing these two basic theories). Bittker and
Rahdert argue that the determinant of a charitable organization's tax rate should be the organization's
ultimate beneficiaries' ability to pay, since the burden of the tax falls on them. Bittker & Rahdert,
supra note 42, at 315. The appropriate tax rates should therefore ideally be determined by imputing
the organization's income to these beneficiaries and taxing it at their individual tax rates. Id. Because
the recipients can rarely be identified in advance, this is not a practical option. Alternatively, the
organization could be taxed, as a surrogate for the ultimate recipients, at the average tax rate that
these individuals would have paid. Id. Bittker and Rahdert view computation of this average as
presenting insurmountable difficulties. Id. at 315-16.
Elsewhere, Bittker suggests that if the purpose of an income tax is to enable the government to use
individual profit to finance the provision of public goods, taxation of charitable organizations is inap-
propriate. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX
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tions from federal income taxation, however, requires exempting them
from unemployment insurance taxes. The unemployment tax, which is
levied regardless of whether the employer has any taxable income at all,
does not diminish or compromise the employer's exemption from the in-
come tax. The two taxes are unrelated. The income tax, revenues from
which finance general public goods, varies according to a progressive rate
schedule and is imposed on income, which, according to Bittker and
Rahdert, cannot be defined or measured for nonprofit organizations. In
contrast, the unemployment tax imposes a uniform tax rate on a measur-
able component of an employer's production costs. It finances a discrete
component of an employer's production costs, not a public good. The ease
of calculating an employer's taxable wage base or an equitable tax rate
does not change simply because an employer is nonprofit rather than for-
profit.
Congress itself has in effect recognized that maintaining the income tax
exemption does not require, nor do the principles underlying it justify, a
blanket exemption of tax-exempt organizations from all other taxes. They
are subject, for example, to the Unrelated Business Income Tax" and to
Social Security taxes.48 In fact, despite the special treatment, since 1970
the federal government has effectively imposed an unemployment tax, col-
lected by state governments, on section 501(c)(3) employers."' Finally, the
J. 244, 255-56 (1969). The charity cannot be said to have profits in the generally understood sense of
the word, because none of the organization's income can accrue to the benefit of any individual in
control of the organization. Id.
45. I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (1982). Under I.R.C. § 511, organizations described in § 501(c) and ex-
empted from taxation by § 501(a) must pay a corporate income tax on their unrelated business in-
come. The terms "unrelated business taxable income" and "unrelated trade or business" are defined
in §§ 512 and 513, respectively.
The legislative history accompanying the enactment of the Unrelated Business Income Tax noted,
"In fac it is not intended that the tax imposed on unrelated business income will have any effect on
the tax-exempt status of any organization." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3053, 3081.
While the taxable income from the unrelated business, unlike that from the charity's exempt busi-
ness, can be calculated, Bittker and Rahdert argue that, for the unrelated as well as the primary,
exempt business, one cannot properly determine the appropriate tax rate, consistent with ability-to-
pay principles. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 42, at 325.
46. Prior to 1983, the Social Security Act provided that employment covered by the Act did not
include "service performed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organization
described in section 501(c)(3). . . which is exempt from income tax under section 501(a)." 26 U.S.C.
§ 3121(b)(8)(B) (1982), repealed by Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102,
97 Stat. 65, 70-71. Employees of § 501(c)(3) organizations could receive social security coverage only
if their employer waived the social security tax exemption. A charitable organization could terminate
the waiver, and thus the social security coverage of its employees, by giving two years advance notice
of its desire to do so. Having once terminated coverage in this fashion, a § 501(c)(3) employer could
not again provide social security coverage for its employees. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(k) (1982). Concerned
by a growing trend among nonprofit employers to terminate the coverage, H.R. REP. No. 25, supra
note 33, at 16-17, Congress repealed the exemption. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat. 65, 70-71 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 3121).
47. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3303(e), 3309 (1982). The preferential treatment simply results in a different
amount paid at a different time.
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unemployment tax exemption is not granted to all tax-exempt organiza-
tions, but only to those which are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3),48
further indicating that imposition of the unemployment tax is not consis-
tent with the income tax exemption of these organizations.
The structure of the unemployment tax itself also does not compel the
preferential treatment of charities. The only practice consistent with the
principles of the unemployment tax would be a straightforward applica-
tion of the statutorily determined tax rates to all employers whose employ-
ees are covered by the program. The savings that accrue to charities as a
result of their exemption from federal tax under the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act thus constitute a subsidy to these organizations. In addition,
the state tax reimbursement option completely transforms the charity's
state unemployment tax payments from an insurance fee, an ordinary and
necessary cost of doing business, to a payment resembling a fine imposed
on the employer for dismissing a worker.49 Not only is the preferential
treatment of charities not mandated by the principles of unemployment
insurance taxation, it is completely contrary to one of the primary tenets
of the program-that unemployment insurance is a cost of doing business.
2. The Analogy to the Income Tax Exemption as a Subsidy
If an exemption from a particular tax is inconsistent with the principles
underlying that tax, the exemption may properly be viewed as a tax ex-
penditure, a subsidy.5" If one could measure the income of a section
501(c)(3) organization, 51 then the section 501(c)(3) income tax exemption
48. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act's preferential treatment of § 501(c)(3) organizations
does not apply to organizations that are exempt from the federal income tax under any of the 22 other
subsections of § 501(c), or under §§ 501(d) or 401(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982) (defining
the exemption in terms of § 501(c)(3)).
49. The annual assessment of unemployment taxes reinforces the character of the tax as an "ex-
tension of the wage system," a regular cost of production. If this tax is not paid at the time the
employee produces goods or services, but rather only after he or she is laid off, the program loses one
of its essential characteristics. The tax is no longer a part of wages paid for services rendered; instead,
it resembles wages that must be paid to an employee who is no longer providing any services.
50. A tax expenditure is a departure from basic tax principles which results in a subsidy paid to
the beneficiary. As Professor Surrey explains, the federal income tax rules consist of two types of
provisions: those tax rules that "constitute the basic structure of the income tax itself and hence are
integral to having such a tax at all," and those which are "special provisions representing Government
expenditures made through the income tax system to achieve various objectives apart from that tax."
S. SURREY, PATIwAYs TO TAX REFORM 7 (1973). The latter group, consisting of special exemp-
tions, deductions, credits, and preferential tax rates, effectively provides the beneficiaries of those rules
with federal monetary assistance. Surrey argues that tax revenue foregone because of tax expenditures
should be regarded in the same way as direct governmental expenditures and thus should be recog-
nized as a subsidy.
51. Professor Hansmann asserts that the taxable income of a charitable organization can in fact
be calculated in a manner consistent with income tax principles. Hansmann, Rationale for Exempt-
ing, supra note 9, at 59-62.
Although state law definitions of what constitutes a nonprofit organization vary quite widely, Pro-
fessor Hansmann suggests that the identifying characteristic of nonprofit organizations is that they are
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could itself be viewed a subsidy. The reasons advanced to justify the in-
come tax subsidy, however, do not extend to the unemployment tax.
The strongest explanation of the charitable income tax exemption fo-
cuses on the exemption's historical development and the traditionally
"public service" nature of charities.52 This public policy rationale suggests
that charitable organizations are properly subsidized because many chari-
ties serve a quasi-governmental function, providing goods or services that
the government would otherwise have to provide. Taxing the "profits" of
a charitable organization in order to finance the government's provision of
public goods would therefore be counter-productive as well as inherently
contradictory. In allowing the charities to retain their funds instead of
paying taxes, the government enables them to provide more services, and
thus saves itself money."'
Subsidizing charities under the unemployment tax, while consistent
with this theory of income tax subsidy, is not mandated by the theory:
Imposition of the unemployment tax would not undermine the validity or
diminish the value of the income tax exemption. Furthermore, the unem-
ployment tax exemption is not an effective mechanism for subsidizing
charities. First, the particular factor cost selected is not related to any
subsidy goal. Subsidizing the firm's unemployment insurance costs ties the
value of the subsidy to the number of employees and to the level of their
subject to a "nondistribution constraint." Hansmann, Role, supra note 9, at 838. The term refers to
the Internal Revenue Code's language prohibiting nonprofit organizations from distributing profits to
individuals exercising control over the organization. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). In Hansmann's view,
this constraint constitutes an essential characteristic of nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit organiza-
tions tend to operate in areas of the economy where there is a "contract failure." In these areas,
patrons are unable to measure the quality or even the actual provision of the good purchased. They
therefore require the additional legal assurance provided by the non-distribution constraint. See
Hansmann, Role, supra note 9, at 843-45. The non-distribution constraint assures patrons who do-
nate to or purchase from the nonprofit organization that their contributions or payments fund only the
desired service.
Professor Hansmann classifies nonprofits into two categories, commercial and donative. Hansmann,
Role, supra note 9, at 840-41. For commercial nonprofit organizations, those whose funding comes
from sales of goods or services that they produce, the method of computing taxable income could be
the same as that which is applied to a for-profit firm. The tax "would effectively be levied on the sum
of (1) earnings saved for expenditure in future years, and (2) net capital investment (i.e. the excess of
expenditures on capital equipment over depreciation allowances)." Hansmann, Rationale for Exempt-
ing, supra note 9, at 59-61 (footnote omitted).
Taxable income can also be calculated for donative nonprofit organizations, those which receive a
substantial portion of their income from donations. Again, the organization's taxable income would be
its retained earnings, that part of the income, whether from donations or other sources, which exceeds
the organization's expenditures on goods and services. Id. at 61-62.
52. See, e.g., B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1-8 (4th ed. 1983);
Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1421-25 (1984). The nature of organizations in
the charitable sector, however, has changed dramatically in recent years. See sources cited supra note
9 (discussing changes in composition of charitable sector).
53. See, e.g., B. HOPKINS, supra note 52, at 5; Houck, supra note 52, at 1424; H.R. REP. No.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (Part II) C.B. 728, 742. But see Hansmann, Ration-
ale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 66-71 (concluding that this rationale is unsatisfying).
1483
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1472, 1985
salaries, 54 rather than to a factor relevant to some social or governmental
objective, such as the firm's efficiency or level of charitable activities."5
Second, significantly different groups bear the burden of paying for
these two subsidies. The federal income tax applies progressive tax rates
to a broad tax base, generating revenues for public purposes. In contrast,
the unemployment tax is a more narrowly based tax, imposed only on
certain employers in order to provide a benefit specifically for their em-
ployees. It is effectively part of the wages an employer must pay. To the
extent that the burden of an employer's payroll tax is in fact passed on to
the employees,56 the unemployment insurance subsidy for charitable
organizations is financed by a regressive tax, borne more heavily by em-
ployees in labor-intensive, low-wage industries.57 In addition, some of the
employers who must bear the cost of this subsidy compete with the non-
profit beneficiaries of the subsidy.58 The preferential treatment thus cre-
ates situations where a for-profit firm must help subsidize its nonprofit
competitors by paying a portion of their labor costs. 59
54. Because the tax is imposed only on the first $7000 paid to each employee, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3306(b) (1982), the cost of unemployment insurance as a percentage of total payroll is higher for
firms with many lower-salaried employees than for those firms in high-salary industries. The subsidy
resulting from the preferential treatment is thus worth more to low-wage or labor-intensive firms. No
one has established a correlation, however, between those factors and the production of goods that
society desires to subsidize.
55. To the extent that the value of the subsidy is tied to the employer's employment record, the
subsidy is directed at promoting a social objective, maintaining stable employment.
56. See D. HAMERMESH, JOBLEsS PAY AND THE ECONOMY 10-14 (1977) (suggesting that per-
haps half of tax burden is borne by employees); see also U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BACKGROUND
PAPER No. 15, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: A BACKGROUND REPORT 16-17 (1976) (citing
study concluding that burden of employer's social security payroll tax is shifted to employee, and
suggesting that same shift of tax burden might be expected for unemployment insurance tax, but
noting that analogy is not precise); cf. G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 105-06
(1975) (major share, if not all, of burden of employer's social security payroll tax is eventually borne
by employees).
57. See D. HAMERMESH, supra note 56, at 14. Because the unemployment insurance tax, like the
social security tax, applies to wage income only up to a certain ceiling, "the incidence of the tax is
• ..regressive above that level. The ceiling in fact inverts the principle of income tax exemption by
allowing such an exemption at the top rather than at the bottom of the scale." R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 44, at 507; see also G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, supra note 56, at 106-07
(noting regressive effect of social security payroll tax).
58. See Hansmann, Effect on Competition, supra note 9, at 2.
59. This may further aggravate unfair competition. See infra Part III.
During the early years of unemployment compensation, when employees of charitable organizations
were not covered, one author noted that "a distinction should be drawn . . . between taxation for
general revenue purposes and 'taxation' for a specific protective use" and suggested that "[w]hile it
may be deemed desirable to subsidize. . .[these] institutions, it is doubtful that the subsidy should be
at the expense of their employees." Gellhorn, supra note 26, at 174 n.3.
The subsidy is no longer provided at the expense of these organizations' employees, but one may
now question whether such a subsidy, if it is desirable, should be financed only by other employers,
some of whom compete with the subsidy's recipients, see supra note 9, or by society as a whole,
through general tax revenues. See also Note, The Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Taxation
of Religious Institutions, 15 LAND & WATER REV. 671, 698 (1980) (suggesting that "[i]f. . .one
keeps in mind the purpose the tax actually serves," otending unemployment tax obligation to reli-
gious institutions is not unthinkable).
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3. The Capital Constraint Argument
Another possible justification for the income tax subsidy, suggested by
Professor Hansmann,60 is that the subsidy compensates for the constraints
on capital formation"1 faced by nonprofit organizations. Even if the sec-
tion 501(c)(3) income tax exemption is an appropriate subsidy, however,
the unemployment tax exemption is not. The theory justifying the former
does not also justify the latter.
The income tax exemption responds directly to the nonprofit organiza-
tion's need for capital: Subsidy mechanism and subsidy goal are closely
linked. Because nonprofit organizations face severe constraints on capital
formation, their net earnings are essential sources of capital for expansion.
These earnings reserved for future expansion, however, are precisely the
organization's "taxable income," as Hansmann defines it.62 Imposing the
income tax, then, would "cut retained earnings roughly in half, and hence
would further cripple a group of organizations that is already capital-
constrained."63 The income tax exemption is thus an effective subsidy for
capital formation.
The timing of the income tax subsidy is also closely linked to the goal
of eliminating constraints on capital formation. Hansmann notes that in-
come taxes would not be a cost for nonprofit firms that have reached their
equilibrium point of development because such firms do not need to pro-
duce profits for equity owners.6 4 At equilibrium, the charity would be
spending all its income on present production, rather than retaining prof-
its for equity owners or for future expansion. With annual receipts equal
to expenditures, including the costs of capital depreciation, the nonprofit
firm would have no retained earnings, and thus no taxable income.65 Ex-
60. Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 72-75.
61. The nondistribution constraint, see supra note 51, makes it more difficult for nonprofits to
raise capital. Because of the nondistribution constraint, nonprofit organizations cannot issue owner-
ship shares, and thus do not have access to equity capital. They are limited to debt, donations, and net
earnings as sources of capital. Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 72. In addition,
the cost of debt capital may be higher for nonprofit organizations than for for-profit organizations. See
Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1017, 1029
(1982) (noting that lenders might charge higher interest rates to nonprofit organizations "because
lenders have difficulty monitoring the nonprofits' behavior").
62. Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 59-62; see also supra note 51.
63. Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 74.
64. Hansmann explains:
[T]here will be no tax liability for a nonprofit firm that is not growing, but rather is spending
all of its income to cover the costs of capital depreciation and variable costs such as
wages .... Thus, income taxes are not a cost to nonprofit firms in equilibrium ....
On the other hand, subjecting nonprofit firms to income taxation will have an indirect effect
on the behavior of the firms. Since such a tax is effectively a tax on retained earnings, it will
reduce the rate at which a nonprofit firm can expand ... [as well as] the aggregate amount of
service that is produced at equilibrium.
Id. at 79-80 (emphasis in original).
65. See supra note 51.
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emption from the income tax would then cease to provide a subsidy. The
income tax exemption is thus not a subsidy paid to nonprofit organiza-
tions at all times. Rather, it is a subsidy given only to those nonprofit
organizations that have not yet reached their equilibrium level of produc-
tion, and that therefore require capital for expansion. The unemployment
tax exemption, however, subsidizes the charity even after it reaches its
equilibrium level of production, and no longer has need for expansion
capital.
In sum, imposing the unemployment tax on charitable organizations
would not impair the charitable income tax exemption subsidy. Preferen-
tial treatment under the Fecieral Unemployment Tax Act is not an effi-
cient mechanism for subsidizing the production of public goods, nor is it
tied to the goal of alleviating capital constraints. While the income tax
exemption removes what would otherwise be a penalty on saving for fu-
ture expansion, the unemployment tax exemption simply lowers one of
the firm's factor costs. The unemployment insurance program's preferen-
tial treatment of charitable organizations is not dictated by principles of
income taxation nor by those of unemployment taxation. In fact, it devi-
ates from the basic tenets of the tax. In the process, it creates a subsidy
that is not well-tailored to any rational goal.
B. Preventing Charities from Subsidizing For-profit Employers
Congress was understandably concerned that charitable organizations,
many of which are financed by donations, not share in the costs of provid-
ing unemployment compensation benefits to the employees of profit-
making firms, 6 and it thus sought to create a self-insurance program for
nonprofit employers.17 The preferential treatment accorded charities was
not necessary, however, to avoid the subsidization of profit-making enter-
prises by charitable organizations. The basic structure of the unemploy-
ment tax, which provides for experiential state tax rates,68 was specifically
designed to minimize, if not eliminate, the extent of any transfer between
employers. Although neither program ensures that an employer pays only
those costs attributable to his or her employees, unemployment compensa-
tion, like social security, is considered to be an "earned" benefit, not wel-
66. The Senate Report does not elaborate on this explanation for the preferential treatment ac-
corded § 501 (c)(3) organizations, stating only that "[tihe committee considers it appropriate that these
organizations, which are often dependent upon charitable contributions, should not be required to
share in the costs of providing benefits to workers in profit-making enterprises." S. REP. No. 752,
supra note 40, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 3618.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
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fare. In theory, then, each employee receives back from the system that
which was contributed on his or her behalf in the first place.
As in any insurance program, there may be some slight transfer of
funds from one payor to another. It is thus possible that there could be
some transfer from charitable organizations to for-profit firms. The fact
that the social security program no longer distinguishes between charitable
and non-charitable employers 9 indicates, however, that it does not contra-
dict social policy to allow the possibility of such a transfer as a result of a
program that creates a public good. In fact, the social security program
creates a greater potential for the transfer of nonprofit funds to for-profit
firms, because the social security program operates as an inter-
generational transfer.70 Any slight cross-subsidy that might result from
imposing the unemployment insurance tax on charitable organizations is
comparatively insignificant.
If there is some transfer, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act's exemp-
tions are not well-tailored to prevent it. First, although Congress seemed
to be concerned only with organizations that rely on donations for their
support,71 all section 501(c)(3) organizations receive preferential treat-
ment,7 '2 regardless of what percentage, if any, of their funding comes from
donations.73 At the same time, other organizations that might be financed
by donations, but do not qualify as charities under section 501(c)(3), do
not benefit from the unemployment tax exemption.7 Second, the concern
about possible income transfers to other employers does not warrant ex-
69. See supra note 46.
70. This generation's workers, more of whom are employed by nonprofit organizations than ever
before, see supra note 8, finance social security benefits for an earlier generation of workers, most of
whom were employed by for-profit firms.
71. In the Senate Report, the only phrase that gave any explanation as to why charitable organi-
zations should not have to assist in financing the unemployment costs of for-profit firms was that
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are "often dependent upon charitable contributions." S. REP. No. 752,
supra note 40, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 3618.
72. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1982).
73. Not all § 501(c)(3) organizations are financed exclusively or even primarily by donations.
Many, such as hospitals and schools, receive a substantial portion of their funding from charging for
the goods or services they provide. See Hansmann, Role, supra note 9, at 840-41 (distinguishing
between donative and commercial nonprofit organizations).
74. Not all organizations that receive donations are § 501(c)(3) organizations. The tax deduction
for charitable contributions is not defined in terms of § 501(c)(3). A taxpayer may deduct contribu-
tions, up to a limit of 50% of the taxpayer's taxable income, to certain organizations, many of which
will also qualify as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1982). Contributions to
certain other organizations are also tax deductible, provided that these contributions do not exceed
20% of the taxpayer's income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B). Among this second group of organizations are
organizations not entitled to § 501(c)(3) status, such as organizations of war veterans, fraternal socie-
ties, and nonprofit cemetery companies. Id. §§ 170(c)(3)-(5). These organizations, many of which
may receive substantial funding from donations, do not have the option of electing the reimbursement
method of paying state unemployment insurance costs, and must also pay the federal unemployment
insurance tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c) (1982) (exemption based on § 501(c)(3) status). Furthermore,
other organizations that do not qualify under either § 170 or any category of § 501 may still receive
donations, but they are not exempt from unemployment taxes.
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emption from the federal unemployment insurance tax, which covers the
administrative expenses of the program. Since each employee benefits
from the protection guaranteed by the unemployment compensation pro-
gram,7 the administrative costs should be financed according to the num-
ber of employees benefitting from the program. 6 Third, a truly separate
self-insurance program for section 501(c)(3) employers should still be con-
sistent with the basic tenets of unemployment insurance. In departing
from the principle of employer-financed reserve funds and requiring em-
ployers only to reimburse the unemployment funds, Congress created a
subsidy, not a self-insurance program.
The special provisions governing section 501(c)(3) employers, imple-
mented to avoid an insignificant potential transfer, in fact create a much
greater subsidy in the other direction. Undermining the basic premises of
the program, the exemptions also create unfair competitive advantages.
III. UNFAIR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
Concerns about unfair competitive advantages have structured the un-
employment insurance program since its inception.77 The federal pro-
gram, imposing a mandatory federal tax that could be offset by state un-
employment tax payments, was specifically designed to eliminate the
competitive advantages that would follow if only a few states imposed un-
employment taxes."8 Congress anticipated at the outset that state pro-
grams would closely follow the structure of the federal program in order
to avoid competitive disadvantages; 79 in fact, states have rarely extended
unemployment coverage unless federal coverage was first extended. 0 The
competitive advantages resulting from variations in the unemployment in-
75. Although not all employees will collect unemployment compensation, each benefits from the
assurance provided, and from the fact that individual provisions for unemployment income are not
necessary. The objective of unemployment insurance is not only to provide support, security, and
dignity for the unemployed worker, but also to "give to the employed workman a sense of security
that that would be done." I. RUBswOW, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY 419 (1934), quoted in G. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 12, at 39.
76. If one assumes "that the cost of serving high-wage and low-wage employers is about the same,
the benefit-received norm would dictate . . . a flat amount for each employee covered." J. BECKER,
supra note 15, at 118.
77. "The initial purpose in the federal unemployment tax . . . was to enable states to enact
unemployment insurance laws without fear that the cost would place their employers at a disadvan-
tage in interstate competition." W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 20, at 346.
78. Imposition of a federal unemployment tax with allowance for state tax credits "[made] it
possible for every state to set up an unemployment compensation plan financed by a payroll tax up to
2.7% without placing its industries at a disadvantage as compared with those in other states." E.
BURNS, supra note 20, at 59.
79. Congress expected that, during the first three years of the program, state tax rates would
increase at the same pace as the federal tax rates. Id. at 59-60.
80. See M. MURRAY, PROPOSED FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AMENDMENTS 6
(1966).
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surance tax ratings were viewed as one of the merits of experiential state
ratings. Because firms with poor unemployment records would face higher
marginal costs as a result of higher unemployment insurance rates, they
would lose a portion of their market share, and perhaps eventually be
forced out of business. Although fundamental to the unemployment insur-
ance program's structure, these concerns about competitive tax advantages
have been ignored in the context of the exemption for section 501(c)(3)
employers.
Because their nonprofit status accords them preferential treatment
under many laws,81 nonprofit organizations may obtain an unfair compet-
itive advantage over profit-motivated firms. Prompted by the expansion of
nonprofit organizations into active business enterprises 2 unrelated to their
exempt purposes, and by concerns about issues of horizontal equity" and
competitive advantages, Congress enacted the Unrelated Business Income
Tax in 1950.84 The fairness concerns that led to the Unrelated Business
Income Tax apply also to the unemployment insurance exemption. Never-
theless, in implementing the unemployment insurance program, Congress
completely ignored the principles underlying the Unrelated Business In-
come Tax.
Some commentators have claimed that the Unrelated Business Income
Tax is unnecessary, arguing that exempting charities from taxation does
not lead to unfair competition." Their arguments, however, do not apply
81. See Hansmann, Role, supra note 9, at 836-37.
82. The tax on unrelated business income does not apply to "passive" income, such as dividends,
interest, royalties, or rents. 26 U.S.C. § 512 (1982). The distinction between passive and active in-
come stems from a congressional belief that "passive" income should not be taxed because "invest-
ment-producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as a proper source of revenue for
educational and charitable organizations." S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 45, reprinted in 1950 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 3083.
83. Horizontal equity is the notion that similarly situated entities should be assessed equal taxes.
For a discussion of horizontal equity, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 44, at 232-33.
84. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, tit. III, § 301, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 479, 528-35 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-515 (1982)). Noting
that "[t]he problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed. . . is primarily that of
unfair competition," the House Report accompanying the enactment of the Unrelated Business In-
come Tax observed that the tax exemption granted to certain organizations "enables them to use their
profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits re-
maining after taxes." S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 45, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 3081.
85. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 42, at 322-26; Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Enti-
ties, 20 UCLA L. REv. 13, 61-68 (1972); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business
by Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 U. CM. L. REV. 581, 591-92 (1965); Note, Colleges, Charities,
and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 875-76 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Note, Colleges,
Charities]. But see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 1021 (arguing that the income tax exemption
does result in competitive advantage in certain circumstances); Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The
Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV. L. REv.
1280, 1282 (1968) (arguing that "the fast accumulation of capital made possible by tax-free profits is
an advantage in any field") [hereinafter cited as Note, The Macaroni Monopoly].
The impact of a charitable organization's unfair competitive advantages in an unrelated business
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to the unemployment tax exemption. The preferential treatment of section
501(c)(3) organizations under the unemployment insurance tax does cre-
ate a problem of unfair competition.
If the income tax is viewed as a tax on pure profits, 6 imposition or
removal of the tax will not change a profit-maximizing firm's production
decisions.8 7 In contrast, the unemployment insurance tax is an excise tax
on the firm's payroll. Imposition of this tax will affect production deci-
sions, because it effectively raises the cost of one factor of production, la-
bor."' This change in the relative prices of inputs alters the firm's optimal
mix of factor inputs 9 and increases the firm's marginal cost90 of produc-
tion. These changes will cause the firm to cut back on production, to the
point where the firm's new, higher marginal cost now equals marginal
will be somewhat limited, since a charity engages in an unrelated business not to maximize profits in
that business, but rather to obtain funds for the organization's primary, exempt activity. See Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 42, at 323-26; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 1029. Thus, even with a
subsidy, the organization would limit its expansion in the unrelated business because capital invested
in the unrelated business is capital diverted from the organization's exempt purposes. The unemploy-
ment insurance tax exemption, however, subsidizes the charitable organization's primary, as well as
its unrelated, business, and thus will not be subject to the same self-limiting trade-off between invest-
ment in the exempt or in the unrelated business.
86. Traditional economic theory suggests that "[a] tax on profits does not change the position of
the marginal revenue and cost schedules; hence it does not change the position of optimum price and
output." R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 277 (1959); see also Note, Colleges,
Charities, supra note 85, at 875-76 (arguing that "the income tax is not an element in the cost of
production and should have no effect" on pricing, although nonprofit firms may engage in uneconomic
price-cutting). Musgrave notes, however, that "the theoretical case is far from conclusive," R. Mus-
GRAVE, supra, at 287; under certain circumstances imposition of the tax will affect price and output.
Id. at 278-87. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 1023 (although "[elconomically oriented
legal commentators" dismiss theory that nonprofits may possess price-cutting advantage, such argu-
ment ignores possibility that nonprofits may affect market prices without "resorting to overtly preda-
tory behavior"); Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 85, at 1281-82 & nn.11-12 (arguing that
although traditional economic theory suggests profits tax affects neither output nor prices, it has not
been empirically determined whether charities may obtain unfair competitive advantages in unrelated
businesses from an ability to engage in price cutting, or whether advantages are due solely to ability to
accumulate capital faster).
87. The level of production that maximizes pre-tax profits will also maximize the after-tax prof-
its. See Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72
J. POL. ECON. 604, 605 (1964) (arguing deductibility of interest from taxable income does not affect
rational decisionmaker's decision to borrow). One condition of Samuelson's theorem is that the tax
rate be uniform over time. To the extent that the firms' income and expenses do not always match,
thus distorting income and tax rates, the income tax is an excise tax on capital, imposition of which
will affect the firm's optimal mix of factor inputs.
88. The tax was imposed as a payroll tax on employers in recognition of the fact that unemploy-
ment costs are a cost of production and should be internalized. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
89. See J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATION 419-28 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing
optimal mix of inputs, which is derived from determination of optimal relative factor proportions and
determination of most profitable level of production).
90. Marginal cost is the additional increment of cost incurred in producing the last unit of goods.
Marginal revenue is the additional increment of revenue resulting from the sale of the last unit pro-
duced. A firm's profit-maximizing level of output is that level where marginal revenue equals margi-
nal cost. See id. at 290.
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revenue."1 Because the unemployment tax properly internalizes costs,92
imposing the tax shifts production and factor employment from a non-
optimal level to the optimal level.
Exempting only certain firms within an industry from the unemploy-
ment tax will lower the marginal cost of production for those firms and
thus increase their profit-maximizing level of production. Because certain
costs of production, the costs of unemployment, are borne externally, this
higher level of production by charitable organizations represents an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources. If charitable organizations increase the total
industry supply beyond the profit-maximizing level of for-profit firms,
certain for-profit firms could be squeezed out of the market, or inhibited
from entering it.9 3 Aided by this competitive advantage created by the un-
employment tax exemption, charitable organizations could thus displace
their for-profit competitors.94
Giving organizations a competitive advantage by reducing their unem-
ployment tax rates might result in a more efficient allocation of society's
resources if, for example, the organizations qualified for the reduced tax
rates based on past employment experience.9 5 The competitive advantage
resulting from this preferential tax treatment of charitable organizations,
91. This dynamic will occur unless either demand or supply is wholly inelastic, in which case
there will be no reduction in output, although price will change. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
supra note 44, at 268-86.
92. A basic premise of the unemployment tax is that
[t]he social and human costs of irregular employment should properly be charged against and
compensated by each employing unit. Only in this way can consumers be assured that a low
price is not a misleading and parasitic price, and that the competitive (or other) system is
really functioning in the public interest.
W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 20, at 341 (quoting Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Idea:
Unemployment Reserves, ANNAts, Nov. 1933, at 65, 72-73 (Nov. 1933).
93. Cf Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting, supra note 9, at 76-77, 80-82 (viewing corporate
income tax as an excise tax on capital and examining the effect of tax exemption on a market consist-
ing of for-profit and nonprofit firms); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 1022-36 (discussing condi-
tions under which the charitable income tax exemption creates unfair competitive pricing advantages).
94. Charitable organizations will benefit from this advantage unless they face absolute constraints
in another area. For example, if the organization were absolutely capital-constrained, it would proba-
bly be unable to expand, unless it received some other very substantial subsidy that enabled the firm
to shift its factor mix significantly. Absent such absolute constraints, however, the firm will benefit
from the competitive advantage of lower after-tax marginal costs.
Depending on other constraints facing the subsidized firm, the competitive advantage may serve
simply to lessen the impact of a pre-existing competitive disadvantage. For example, the income tax
exemption may not fully compensate for the disadvantage resulting from the higher capital costs faced
by nonprofit organizations. See supra note 61. The unemployment tax exemption probably does not
completely eliminate the remaining competitive disadvantage. Nonetheless, the unemployment tax ex-
emption will diminish the charitable organization's disadvantage. The exempt organization will thus
occupy a larger share of the market than it would have without the preferential treatment.
95. The proposition that a competitive advantage resulting from experience rating allocates re-
sources efficiently is premised on the assumption that unemployment compensation is an ordinary and
necessary cost of doing business that should be internalized and reflected in the prices of goods and
services. To the extent that the experience rates create tax incentives for firms to retain employees past
the point at which it would be more profitable to let them go, however, the experience rating system
distorts the market, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.
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however, is based not on any efficiency considerations," but solely on the
organization's status. When a profit-motivated organization is in fact more
efficient than its nonprofit competitor, granting a subsidy according to
nonprofit status will result in an inefficient and inequitable allocation of
resources.
CONCLUSION
"[T]he development of unemployment compensation requires a philo-
sophical as well as a practical approach."97 Charitable organizations have
long been recognized as proper recipients of governmental subsidies and
special considerations. The law governing unemployment insurance, how-
ever, has inappropriately exempted these organizations from the obliga-
tions imposed on other employers. The product of an unexamined defer-
ence to the traditional exemptions, the preferential treatment accorded
charitable organizations under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ig-
nores considerations of fairness and concerns for appropriate allocation of
resources.
Congress' 1970 decision that section 501(c)(3) employers should partici-
pate in the unemployment insurance program moved the law in the right
direction, and evidenced a clearer legislative understanding of the tenets of
the program. Nevertheless, the distinctions that persist between charitable
organizations and other employers enable the former to "purchase" unem-
ployment insurance at a lower price than the latter do. In so doing, the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act creates a subsidy for charities that is
financed in part by the charities' for-profit competitors. Because unem-
ployment insurance is an ordinary and necessary cost of doing business,
and the subsidy of charitable organizations' ordinary business costs gives
those organizations an unfair competitive advantage over for-profit firms
without efficiently promoting any clear social goals, Congress should elim-
inate this preferential treatment.
-Amy L. Henrich
96. In fact, the exemption creates inefficiencies. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
97. Malisoff, supra note 14, at 258.
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